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 TELEVISION PROGRAMME LICENSING:  
ENDGAME FOR EXCLUSIVITY?
Branka Marušić*
Summary: This paper analyses territorial licences in broadcasting 
and their effect on the internal market. Particular attention is paid to 
market freedoms (goods and services), taking into account the  outco-
me of a pending ruling before the ECJ with regard to the selling of 
Premier League broadcasting rights. 
Introduction
In this digital era of television, consumers all over Europe, by means 
of digital decoders, have gained a wide choice of television service provi-
ders, programme packages and television channels. On the other hand, 
copyright holders of television content which freely flows through these 
same devices have gained a secure way of observing copyright. 
The introduction of digital receivers and satellites, as well as digital 
decoder cards, has enabled broadcasting bodies to introduce broadca-
sting territorial licences which curb the free flow of services, as well as 
goods, and strengthen the rights of copyright holders on the market. This 
form of copyright protection is common in the sale of broadcasting rights 
for football matches. Although the Audio Visual Media Directive1 stipu-
lates that events of major importance to the European public, such as 
the World Cup and the UEFA Champions League, cannot be curbed to 
an extent that prevents the viewer from receiving information as well as 
extracts from the programme, that same protection does not yet apply 
when it comes to the sale of broadcasting rights for national football lea-
gues all over Europe. 
The joined cases of the Football Association Premier League Ltd and 
Others v QC Leisure and Others and Karen Murphy v Media Protection 
Services Ltd,2  involving the sale of broadcasting rights of the Premier 
*  Final year student of law at the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb.
1 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 
on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative ac-
tion in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive) [2010] OJ L95/1.
2 Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v 
QC Leisure and Others and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, delivered on 4 Oc-
tober 2011. The joined cases concern the legality of the use of satellite decoders purchased 
outside the United Kingdom to show Premier League football matches in public houses in 
the United Kingdom. 
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League, have already been dubbed by the British media as Murphy’s Law 
and the Bosman3 of broadcasting rights.4 Whether they will change the 
broadcasting of football matches as we know it remains to be seen.
The issue that has arisen involves the sale of broadcasting rights of 
football matches to different countries in the form of licence agreements 
through a bidding process. These licence agreements were formed diffe-
rently for specific countries and involve a different purchasing price for 
broadcasting rights on the basis of a territoriality principle.  According to 
this principle, a sporting event has a different value in relation to where 
it is broadcast, and deriving from this, matches broadcast on a specific 
territory command a higher price than if these matches were broadcast 
on a territory which does not find such matches (or sport) interesting. In 
this specific case, we have a Greek broadcaster who purchased the rights 
for a lower price than its UK counterpart. The Greek broadcaster sells 
the decoder cards in the UK, and thus breaches the licence agreement 
made with the Football Association Premier League Ltd (FAPL), the top 
English football league organisation for marketing the league’s matches. 
The question now remains whether or not the Greek decoder cards are 
an ‘illicit device’ and whether the contractual stipulations in the form of 
an exclusive licence can be allowed under EU law. The outcome of the 
case can lead either to the validation of territorial licences and with it the 
partition of the internal market, or to the scrapping of territorial licences, 
and thus hindering the protection of copyright. The question that rema-
ins is whether Europe is ready to jeopardise market freedoms for more 
stringent copyright protection. 
The broadcasting framework 
Broadcasting and its embedded copyright in the European Union 
is safeguarded by a legal framework consisting of three directives. The 
3 C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bos-
man, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations 
européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman  [1995] ECR I-04921. Bosman was a 
football player in the Belgian First Division whose contract had expired in 1990. He wanted 
to transfer to Dunkerque, a French team. However, Dunkerque did not offer his Belgian 
club RFC Liege a sufficient transfer fee, so Liege refused to let him go. The case challenged 
the legality of the system of transfers for football players and the existence of so-called 
‘quota systems’, whereby only a limited number of foreign players were allowed to play in a 
club match. After the judgment, UEFA altered the rules on the transfer of football players, 
as well as the so-called ‘quota systems’.
4 Owen Gibson, ‘EC Official’s Court Advice in TV Rights Case Worries Premier League’ 
The Guardian (London 3 February 2011) <www.guardian.co.uk/football/2011/feb/03/
ec-tv-rights-premier-league>. See also Adrian Goldberg, ‘Premier League Face Potential 
‘Bosman’ of TV Rights’ (BBC Mobile News 3 October 2010) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/busi-
ness-11452434> both sites accessed 21 October 2011.
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first is Directive 2010/13/EU (the AVMS Directive)5 which in its provisi-
ons defines broadcasting6 and the broadcaster.7 The second Directive is 
Directive 98/84 (Conditional Access Directive)8  whose provisions safe-
guard the observance of copyright embedded in broadcasting which is 
distributed through devices such as satellites or digital decoders. Last is 
the Copyright Directive9 which tackles the subject matter of programmes 
embedded in the broadcasting signal. 
Broadcasting, and especially the broadcasting signal, was recogni-
sed early on in Sacchi10 and Bond11 as a service which cannot be limi-
ted to a specific territory, because the nature of the broadcasting signal 
is such that it travels over national borders with no obstacle. The su-
bject matter of that signal is audiovisual media services as defined by the 
AVMS Directive,12 namely programmes, and they fall under the provision 
of services as stated by the Court in De Agostini.13
 In the course of the development of this specific field, lawmakers 
found that the only way to protect the specific subject matter of broadca-
sting and its embedded copyright was to concentrate on the service 
carriers. Service carriers, unlike the broadcasting signal, have a material 
form and can be limited to a specific territory. Today, broadcasters choo-
se which sort of service carriers and technology they will use in order to 
distribute their signal. This enables the copyright holders to consider to 
which broadcaster they will grant rights, depending on the manner of the 
signal distribution.  In this respect, at the EU level, the AVMS Directi-
ve14 provides a clear definition of what constitutes broadcasting and who 
5 Directive 2010/13/EU (n 1).
6 Directive 2010/13/EU  (n 1)  article 1 (e) ‘television broadcasting’ or ‘television broadcast’ 
(ie a linear audiovisual media service) means an audiovisual media service provided by a 
media service provider for the simultaneous viewing of programmes on the basis of a pro-
gramme schedule.
7 Directive 2010/13/EU (n 1) article 1 (f) ‘broadcaster’ means a media service provider of 
television broadcasts.
8 Directive 98/84 EC of the European Parliament and of Council of 20 November 1998 
on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access [1998] OJ 
L320.
9 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society [2001] OJ L167.
10 Case 155/73 Giuseppe Sacchi [1974] ECR 00409 paras 6-8.
11 Case C-352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and others v The Netherlands State [1988] ECR 
02085 para17.
12 Directive 2010/13/EU (n 1) article 1 a.
13 Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v De Agostini 
(Svenska) Förlag AB (C-34/95) and TV-Shop i Sverige AB [1997] ECR I-03843 paras 27 and 
28.
14 Directive 2010/13/EU (n 1).
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can be a broadcaster, while the Conditional Access Directive15 tackles 
problematic copyright protection by introducing measures against frau-
dulent service carriers which, in this case, are satellite dishes, decoding 
equipment and decoder cards. 
Due to the fact that service carriers are in a material form and, in 
the light of the Treaty, are considered as goods, the issue of limiting the 
free flow of goods has arisen. When we have two competing freedoms, 
the freedom to provide goods and the freedom to provide services, they 
should be observed through the Court’s line in Schindler,16 whereby the 
dominant freedom prevails when the second one is ancillary to it. In our 
case, it is evident that satellite dishes, decoding equipment and decoder 
cards are the means of receiving the service, and without the broadca-
sting signal there would be no use for them for potential viewers.  Even 
if we do not take such a line, and if we examine both of them separately, 
we should bear in mind that property derogation (and, accordingly, in-
tellectual property) applies to them both.
The Premier League case: what is it good for? 
The case should provide answers to several questions which are cu-
rrently not settled in the case law of the ECJ with regard to broadcasting, 
and especially the licensing system within it, and the way it correlates 
to market freedoms. Where is the line between an acceptable territori-
al licence and one that causes anticompetitive behaviour and breaches 
market freedoms? What exactly is an ‘illicit device’, and do we count only 
pirate devices or in fact any device that is bound by a contract? And 
lastly, what is communication to the public, the criterion that is used to 
distinguish between users that can be punished, and those that cannot, 
for the unauthorised usage of the aforementioned illicit device? 
The subject-matter of broadcasting: copyright 
Intellectual property rights in the European Union are a conundrum. 
Primarily, their role is to protect the private ownership of their proprietor 
and whilst doing so not to impede or disturb the common market. This 
delicate balance is often hard to achieve, and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union has through the years tried to strike this delicate balance.
Although a plethora of different intellectual property rights (IPR) 
currently exist,17 they all have the same features in common: they are 
15 Directive 98/84 EC (n 8).
16 Case C-275/92 Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v Gerhart Schindler and Jörg Schindler 
[1994] ECR I-01039 para 20-25.
17 For example, patents, trademarks, copyright, design rights, etc.
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confined to a specific territory; they confer protection of an intellectual 
property right holder in a particular Member State; they are exclusive in 
their nature; and they concern property rights.18
Protection of IPRs is still mainly confined to the Member States 
themselves. There have been some harmonisation measures, most nota-
bly, in connection with the case at hand, Copyright Directive 2001/29/
EC.19 Before the enactment of this Directive,20 the Court had an extensive 
case law concerning IPRs.
The licence: protection of copyright
In its case law, the Court has had the tough task of reconciling the 
need to safeguard legitimate industrial and commercial property rights 
protected under national law and the free movement of both goods and 
services, as well as competition law. The entire concept of a property 
right, and accordingly an intellectual property right, is that such a right 
confers on its holder the exclusive right to behave in a certain way on 
the market. An intellectual right proprietor can choose to distribute the 
right itself or confer such a process on a third party. The proprietor can 
also limit its own distribution to a particular geographical area and grant 
licences for other territories. 
Territorial exclusivity in the form of an exclusive licence is conside-
red a means to penetrate a market and at the same time presents a way 
to preserve the proprietor’s right. This can be done in the form of a sole 
licence, where the proprietor distributes its rights on the territory, or an 
exclusive licence where the proprietor authorises a third party to dis-
tribute the right on a specific territory with the introduction of a clause 
which forbids parallel import. 
In broadcasting, the concept of territorial licences developed both 
through competition and market freedoms. In competition, it developed 
through a licensing system of patent and trade mark rights, while in 
market freedoms it came through the exhaustion of the rights doctrine. 
Competition
In Premier League,21  the issue was whether the clauses of an exclu-
sive licence agreement concluded between a holder of intellectual pro-
perty rights and a broadcaster constitute a restriction on competition 
because they oblige the broadcaster not to supply decoding devices giving 
18 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (2nd edn, OUP 
2010) 173-175. 
19 Directive 2001/29/EC (n 9).
20 Directive 2001/29/EC (n 9). 
21 Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 (n 2).
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access to that right holder’s protected subject matter outside the territory 
covered by the licence agreement.
The concept of licences first developed in competition rules. In the 
landmark decision in Nungesser vs Commission22 (Maize seeds) the Court 
recognised that open licences (a licensor grants a licensee the licence to 
distribute a certain intellectual property right) are allowed under compe-
tition rules, but absolute territorial protection is not. The Court defined 
this outlook in Consten vs Grunding23 by stating that absolute territorial 
protection could lead to the infringement of competition rules, and licen-
ces which grant territorial protection per se and have an effect in partiti-
oning the market should be treated harshly. But it is still possible for an 
individual to seek exemption from the Commission, as was done in Film 
purchase by German Television Stations,24 and to advocate or apply for a 
block exemption
It seems that the Court had a change of heart when it comes to 
licences which tackle performing copyright, which is also embedded in 
a broadcasting signal. In Coditel II,25 it stated that in special circum-
stances, which we see in the protection of the intellectual property of 
performing rights, a licence may need absolute protection from re-tran-
smission from other Member States. Moreover, the Court stated in Radio 
Telefis Eireann v Commission26 that such protection is necessary in order 
to protect the owner’s moral rights in the work and ensure a reward for 
creative endeavour. 
In the specific case of Premier League,27 the Court reaffirmed its pre-
vious ruling in the Coditel  II28 judgment with a slight twist. The Court 
pointed out that agreements aimed at partitioning national markets 
according to national borders or that make the interpenetration of natio-
nal markets more difficult must be regarded, in principle, as agreements 
whose object is to restrict competition. But when we observe the object 
of the restriction of competition (in this case, contractual clauses) we 
need to take other circumstances into consideration (which fall within 
the object’s economic and legal context) which are capable of justifying 
22 Case 258/78 LC Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission of the European Communi-
ties [1982] ECR 02015 paras 44-79.
23 Joined Cases 56 and 58-64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-
GmbH v Commission of the European Economic Community, ECR French edition 00429, 343.
24 Film purchases by German television stations (Case IV/31.734) Commission Decision 
89/536/EEC [1989] OJ L284/36.
25 Case 262/81 Coditel SA, Compagnie générale pour la diffusion de la télévision, and others 
v Ciné-Vog Films SA and others [1982]  ECR 03381 para 20.
26 Case T-69/89 Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission of the European Communities [1991] 
ECR II-00485 para 71.
27 Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 para137-146 (n 2).
28 Case 262/81 (n 25).
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such an agreement and thus making it not liable to impair competition. 
The Court concluded that the granting of a sole licence is not a restriction 
of competition, but that clauses which prohibit broadcasting outside the 
territory specified in the licence are. However, we need to be careful with 
this specific issue, firstly because FAPL never provided any arguments or 
evidence in support of other considerations which fall within the object’s 
economic and legal context (a sort of ‘get-out of an anti-competiveness 
accusation’ card), and secondly because clauses of agreements in general 
do not fall under competition rules. The conclusion that I draw from this 
is that FAPL’s practice would have been allowed if they had provided the 
Court with an explanation of why such licence clauses that partition the 
market are needed in the current economic and legal context. In my view, 
this omission of FAPL just demonstrates how a default rule works, and 
the lack of explanation why an exception should have been granted in 
their case leads to more confusion in the current licence granting system. 
The fact still remains that territorial licences are allowed under competi-
tion rules and that nothing has effectively changed in this regard. What 
we can say has changed, however, is that the way these licences can be 
granted has become more complex and confusing. 
Doctrine of the exhaustion of rights in market freedoms 
Three issues come into play when we observe licences in broadca-
sting: the service of broadcasting, the protection of copyright, which may 
curb the freedom of the service itself, and the protection of cultural and 
language diversity. They specifically protect the subject matter of the 
broadcasting signal, which comes in the form of programmes, images, 
advertisements, clips, etc, and hence fall into the category of copyright. 
The main principle of copyright is to protect literary and artistic works 
against unauthorised copying and to financially reward producers and 
proprietors. Through such protection, the producer is incentivised to cre-
ate more works to enrich the cultural scene of his or her community, 
and in the sense of a single market, to enrich the culture and language 
preservation of the European family.  With regard to this special function, 
the Court recognised in Warner Brothers29 that the specific subject matter 
of copyright contained two essential rights of the author: the exclusive 
rights of reproduction and of performance.
In the first wave of cases, notably Consten and Grunding,30 the Court 
separated two notions: the first is the sole existence of the IPR (with re-
gard to the conditions for obtaining it, procedures by which one grants 
29 Case 158/86 Warner Brothers Inc and Metronome Video ApS v Erik Viuff Christiansen 
[1988] ECR 02605 para 18.
30 Joined cases 56 and 58-64 (n 20).
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the right) and the other is the exercise of the right. These two elements 
should be observed separately. 
In the case of Deutsche Grammophon,31 the Court went further, re-
cognising the specific subject matter of the IPR which can be protected 
by national law. But there is a catch. The IPR holder has a choice. The 
choice is that the subject matter can be absolutely protected under natio-
nal law and no one can use it without authorisation. In this way, the IPR 
holder is confined to one territory or Member State and effectively has a 
monopoly and receives profit from that right. If the IPR holder wishes to 
profit from a specific right and to export, and if the holder places it on the 
market in any state of the European Union, it can be considered that the 
aforementioned protection does not apply and that the holder has exhau-
sted its rights. The meaning is that if the IPR holder lawfully markets its 
right in another Member State, then that right under the mutual recogni-
tion principle can return to the state from which the IPR holder marketed 
it, or the state of origin, as the Court confirmed in HAG II.32  In order for 
the exhaustion of rights doctrine to apply, the consent of the IPR holder 
is needed to export out of its comfort zone. 
The doctrine of exhaustion of rights also applies to the exclusive 
right of reproduction. The holder exhausts that right when it has enjoyed 
it, that is, when it has chosen where to circulate its work, as the Court 
confirmed in Deutsche Grammophon33 and GEMA.34 This also applies 
when the protection period in one Member State elapses, as the Court 
confirmed in EMI Electrola.35 Once again, if there is no choice or specific 
consent given by the copyright holder (either by the holder or its repre-
sentative), or if there is still a valid protection period, there is no exhau-
stion of rights. 
The rights of performance are different by nature, as was rightly 
noted by the Court in Coditel I.36 In essence, they can be infinitely repe-
ated, and as such it is legitimate for the copyright holder to calculate its 
fees for every probable performance and to territorially limit the area over 
which its right will be shown, even where these limits coincide with nati-
31 Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & 
Co. KG [1971] ECR 00487 paras 12 and 13.
32 Case 10/89 CNL-Sucal v HAG [1990] ECR I-3711 paras12-15.
33 Case 78/70 (n 26).
34 Joined cases 55/80 and 57/80 Musik-Vertrieb membran GmbH et K-tel International v 
GEMA [1981] ECR 00147 paras 17 and 18.
35 Case 341/87 EMI Electrola GmbH v Patricia Im- und Export and others [1989] ECR 00079 
paras 11-14.
36 Case 62/79  SA Compagnie générale pour la diffusion de la télévision, Coditel, and others 
v Ciné Vog Films and others [1980] ECR 00881 paras 12-14.
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onal territories. With the Coditel I37 judgment, the basis for an exclusive 
territorial licence was made and this view was reaffirmed in the Warner 
Brothers38 judgment.
In the Premier League,39 the Court, having in mind the aforementio-
ned case law, took a very careful conservative position. The Court stated 
that FAPL could not be considered as a copyright holder under EU law, 
because football matches do not fall under copyright protection.40 The 
reason is that football matches are not original in the sense that they are 
an author’s own intellectual creation. The Court put it bluntly: matches 
are subject to the rules of the game and leave no room for creative free-
dom. By this definition, FAPL cannot creatively intervene in the football 
match, nor creatively control it. However, the fact that EU law does not 
recognise this as copyright does not preclude national legislation from 
doing so,41 as long as the national legislation does not go beyond what 
is necessary to reach the objective of protection of this right. Bidding for 
a territorial licence was deemed by the Court as going beyond what is 
necessary.42 The Court concluded this after analysing the proportiona-
lity of the bidding process and the preservation of copyright. First, the 
Court stated that the broadcasting signal falls under the provisions of 
services43 and that a territorial licence is an obstacle to the free move-
ment of services.44 The Court continued the analysis by acknowledging 
that derogation from the freedom to provide services can be justified on 
the basis of protection of the right of the holder of the IPR and its right 
to be remunerated accordingly.  Unfortunately for FAPL, the right to be 
remunerated accordingly does not include the bidding process introdu-
ced by them. Adequate remuneration is allowed, but artificially creating 
a higher remuneration than adequate through the bidding process goes 
beyond what is necessary to attain the objective (in this case, the right to 
adequate remuneration).  Essentially, what the Court did was to reaffirm 
the principle of territoriality when adequate remuneration is calculated 
and that bidding only creates false and often exaggerated remuneration 
which hurts consumers and benefits the holders of IPRs.
The conclusion to be drawn is that at the EU level this specific su-
bject matter in a form of copyright is neither regulated nor protected un-
der existing legislation. It is up to the Member States to decide whether 
37 Case 62/79 (n 31) para18.
38 Case 158/86 (n 24).
39 Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 (n 2).
40 ibid paras 97, 98.
41 ibid  paras 100-105.
42 ibid paras 108-118.
43 ibid paras 78-83.
44 ibid paras 88, 89.
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they want to protect this subject matter as copyright. In any case, the mi-
nimum provided by EU legislation should be observed (such as the rights 
of a copyright holder) and not be perverted or exaggerated. I am still of 
the opinion that licences are a good idea and bring more advantages to 
the whole broadcasting system, especially to consumers.
Protection of consumers through the licensing system
An exclusive territorial licence is intended to prevent unauthorised 
devices from entering a country. In essence, this restricts equally the 
circulation of all illicit devices, originating from outside or inside a spe-
cific country. The price of a territorial licence is fixed according to the 
number of viewers and revenues collected per potential viewer. This ena-
bles broadcasters to pay a price proportionate to the revenue they re-
ceive. Furthermore, it falls under the Treaty exception of industrial and 
commercial property, as confirmed by the Court in Coditel II.45 
The practice of the territorial licensing of sports broadcasting is se-
riously threatened by the activities of those who deal in foreign decoder 
cards, or who use them to watch programmes. This leads to the loss of 
business for legal undertakings, resulting in the demise of competition 
and innovation on the side of those same undertakings, and job losses on 
the side of employees. If this licensing practice was not possible, bodies 
which sell these rights would have to stop selling the broadcasting rights 
to territories where games are not popular. This would increase the price 
of rights in the core territories in order to recuperate the loss of revenue, 
which would affect consumers. Consumers in core territories would end 
up paying more, while consumers in minor territories would not be able 
to watch games.  
Furthermore, with the existence of a territorial licence, consumers 
are able to receive broadcasting in their own languages, a measure that 
protects the cultural diversity of nations as set in the provisions of the 
Treaty and protects the fundamental right to receive information in the 
mother tongue. Moreover, such diversity leads to media pluralism, be-
cause it fuels the creation of new specialised television channels, allowing 
the consumer to choose a media service provider, the language of the 
broadcast and the variety of programmes supplied by the media service 
provider. This again increases competition between broadcasting entities, 
leading to lower prices to obtain the desired television channel and a wide 
choice of suitable media service providers for the consumer.
We also have to take into account the fact that some of the money 
made by broadcasting rights is poured back into the community. In the 
45 Case 262/81 (n 22) para 13.
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UK alone, an estimated 30% of earnings fund grassroot sports46 which 
aid in the development of poorer areas as well as in the promotion of 
sport among children, helping to fight obesity and related health pro-
blems. These earnings also fuel funding for the development of professi-
onal sport, sports scholarships and the betterment of the final sport pro-
duct that viewers watch on their television screens. The spill-over effect 
of this current trend of funding is visible in other sports, which are now 
incentivised to give back to the community under a scheme similar to the 
one used by FAPL.
Illicit devices or authorised service carriers?
The first issue which arises with broadcasting rights rendered throu-
gh territorial licences is the devices which enable their proliferation. 
There is an argument that the decoder cards in this specific case can 
be viewed as illicit devices. The wording of article 2 (e) of the CA Direc-
tive47 on  ‘illicit devices’ encompasses both pirate devices which are ‘de-
signed or adapted’ to give access to a protected service, as well as devices 
which are legally manufactured but used without the authorisation of the 
service provider. 
The difference between a legitimate and an illegitimate device is 
based on the authorisation given by the service provider. Accordingly, 
when the device that provides access to a protected service is used out-
side the territory for which the authorisation is granted, that device is 
used without authorisation and is therefore illicit.
In the present case, Greek brodcasters were given the exclusive 
right to provide a broadcasting service specifically within the territory of 
Greece. Since the explicit contractual obligation impedes selling outside 
Greece, Greek brodcasters cease to act as the authorised service provider 
when providing its service outside Greece. 
I have to agree with the conclusion of AG Kokott48 that the contrac-
tual obligation linked to broadcasting licences requiring the broadcaster 
to prevent its satellite decoder cards from being used outside the licensed 
territory has the same effect as agreements to prevent or restrict parallel 
exports.  Furthermore, the decoding equipment, in order to be considered 
an illicit device, must be designed or adapted to give access without au-
thorisation, rather than being devices without authorisation.49 The aim of 
46 European Union Committee, Grassroots Sort and the European Union (HL 2010-11, 130) 
25-30.
47 Directive 98/84 EC (n 8).
48 Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 (n 2), Opinion of AG Kokott, para 239.
49 Directive 98/84 EC (n 8) article 2(e).
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the provision in the CA Directive is protection against pirate devices which 
are unlawfully made without previous authorisation, as stated in recital 6 
of the CA Directive and its conceptual predecessor, the Green Paper. 
It can also be argued that the Greek broadcasters received authori-
sation from FAPL to distribute their programme and decoding equipment 
through the licence, which serves as authorisation from FAPL. In its 
practical enforcement, ‘illicit devices’ cover both decoders and satellites; 
in this case, these are products lawfully produced in Greece, thus the 
mutual recognition principle set in Cassis de Dijon50 applies and smart 
cards which are the receivers of the encrypted service are authorised car-
ds due to the fact that FAPL gave authorisation to Greek broadcasters. 
This view is also supported in the Premier League51 judgment where it 
was considered irrelevant whether these devices were procured by giving 
a false name or address. 
Commercial purpose or private purpose in the context of communi-
cation to the public
The second issue is the usage of service carriers. In short, if they are 
used for the commercial purposes of communication to the public they 
breach copyright because remuneration is not received by the copyright 
holder, but by the service carrier.
The CA Directive52 and the Commission’s Green Paper53 aim to pro-
hibit and sanction commercial activities which enable illegal access to a 
protected service. This wording excludes private individuals due to the 
fact that it does not include the private-purpose usage of the end user. 
It can be argued that bar owners in the UK are such private users, 
because their commercial activity is focused on rendering the service of 
catering and not on the service of broadcasting. In order to be considered 
a broadcaster and thus render the service of broadcasting under the CA 
Directive,54 you need to make an initial transmission of the signal and 
there needs to be a communication of programmes between undertakings. 
Under the Rental Rights Directive55 and Copyright Directive56 which de-
50 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 
00649 para 8.
51 Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 (n 2) paras 64-67 and 71-74.
52 Directive 98/84 EC (n 8).
53  Commission, Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Encrypted Services in the Internal 
Market COM (96) 76.
54 Directive 98/84 EC (n 8).
55 Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Decem-
ber 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the 
field of intellectual property [2006] OJ L376/28. 
56 Directive 2001/29/EC (n 9).
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fine ‘communication to the public for commercial purposes’, it is stated 
that broadcasters only have the right to prohibit the showing of their 
broadcasts where there is an entrance fee in place.
I am not inclined to accept this line of argumentation. I am more of 
the opinion that the term ‘possession for commercial purposes’ in article 
4(a) of the CA Directive includes all commercial activities directed at gain-
ing profit.
The CA Directive imposes sanctions only on commercial activities 
but does not define what constitutes such an activity. However, as rightly 
pointed out by the Court in Firma E Merck v Hauptzollamt Hamburg,57 in 
interpreting a provision of Community law, it is necessary to consider not 
only its wording but also the aimed objectives. In this respect, recital 13 
of the CA Directive clarifies the concept of the term ‘for commercial pur-
poses’ by making explicit reference to ‘direct and indirect financial gain’. 
It is not hard to imagine that bar owners possess decoding devices 
for commercial purposes.  According to recital 13  (along with recitals 3, 
4, 5, and 6), the essential purpose of the CA  Directive is to protect the 
service and not the sale of the device. In connection with this, as stated in 
Sacchi,58 the transmission of television signals principally comes within 
the provision of services. 
Since bar owners do not limit themselves to unauthorised posses-
sion of devices, but use them to advantage in attracting a large number 
of customers to maximise their profit, it means that they are using the 
devices for commercial purposes. It is my view that the private purpose 
usage includes only usage for purely non-commercial purposes, which 
excludes profit making by means of decoding equipment. Moreover, the 
public showing of a protected intellectual right does not fit with the doc-
trine of exhaustion of rights, as stated in Metronome Musik.59
In the Premier League60 case, the Court reaffirmed the difference 
between private users and public users, specifically stating that the au-
dience in public houses represented public and not private users because 
such customers constitute an additional public which was not conside-
red by the authors when they authorised the broadcasting of their wor-
ks. Furthermore, airing football matches was deemed to be an economic 
activity which produced economic gain. Moreover, the Court stated that 
a breach of copyright (in the light of the Copyright Directive) was com-
mitted by the bar owners, not on the airing of football matches, but on 
57 Case 292/82 Firma E Merck v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1983] ECR 03781 para 12.
58 Case 155-73 (n 9).
59 Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik GmbH v Music Point Hokamp GmbH [1998] ECR 
I-01953 paras 16 and 17.
60  Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 (n 2) paras 197- 207.
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the embedded World Feed inside the signal. Unlike football matches, the 
World Feed, which consists of a series of immersed logos, commercials, 
anthems, and football match highlights in the same signal that transfers 
the football matches, is under the creative control of FAPL. Because FAPL 
can creatively control it, it was deemed by the Court that FAPL enjoys co-
pyright protection of it, and consequently the bar owners were breaching 
its copyright. 
The consequences of the judgement for internal market freedoms
As hinted at the beginning of this article, the outcome of the case can 
lead either to the validation of territorial licences, and with it the partiti-
on of the internal market, or to the scrapping of territorial licences, thus 
hindering the protection of copyright. 
We have seen in the recent Viking Gas61 case that the Court was 
ready to accept AG Kokott’s opinion with regard to the exhaustion of 
exclusive rights granted by trademark exclusive licences. If the Court had 
abided with the Opinion of AG Kokott62 in the Premier League case, terri-
torial licences in broadcasting would have become a thing of the past.
As has been shown in this paper, the Court took a very cautious and 
arguably a non revolutionary path when deciding this case.  It tackled 
four points: illicit devices, the justification of intellectual property rights 
when derogating from the provisions of services; territorial licences in 
competition law; and the meaning of communication to the public.  None 
of the Court’s reasoning amounted to anything new or unexpected.
In regards to illicit devices, the Court stated that something lawfully 
made and placed on the market in another Member State cannot be re-
garded as illicit. In the issue of intellectual property rights, the Court’s 
approach was rather like ‘washing one’s hands of the matter’, stating as it 
did that the Copyright Directive is a minimal harmonisation tool, and does 
not cover football matches per se, but does cover certain aspects such as 
the World Feed (inserted logos, anthems, commercials, etc, in the signal). It 
went on to say that in essence it is up to the Member States to protect such 
copyright if they deem it to be copyright in the first place. This cautious 
approach, although wise in the current situation, still did not answer the 
key question of what today can be considered copyright on television and 
how far its holder can go to protect it. It is my opinion that the ruling in 
this respect just opened Pandora’s Box, and we will be seeing judgments 
in future where the Court will be forced to take a stronger stance. We can 
61 Case C-46/10 Viking Gas A/S v Kosan Gas A/S, formerly BP Gas A/S [2011] ECR 
I-00000.
62 Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 (n 37).
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see this already happening in a judgment rendered nine days after Premier 
League. In  Airfield and Canal Digitaal,63 which concerned satellite packa-
ge providers, the Court complicated matters even more by saying that for 
every transmission that is protected by copyright there needs to be direct 
authorisation from its holder (both for the service provider, in this case the 
satellite package provider, and the broadcaster). Taking this double autho-
risation into account, and the fact that the manner in which it is currently 
rendered consists of licence agreements, it seems that copyright protection 
has just become a little more complicated.
In respect of territorial licences, it appears that the interpretation of 
contractual clauses as being anti-competitive is seen more as the omi-
ssion of representatives of the applicant to defend them rather than the 
introduction of new legal aspects to them. The novelty in the system of 
territorial licences is that remuneration based on the bidding process 
goes beyond what is necessary to reach the objective of protection of 
copyright and as such breaches the free movement of services. Finally, 
communication to the public after this judgment also encompasses 
viewing in public houses.
For a judgment which was keenly awaited and deemed so important, 
the caution of the Court and the strong compromise made, resulted, in 
the words of Shakespeare, in much ado about nothing. The status quo is 
preserved, although it has become a little more complicated, which, on 
balance, is a positive thing. 
The most worrying concern for any copyright holder is how to protect 
its right. In my opinion, a licensing system, although not perfect, is the 
only effective way to protect broadcasting rights since the broadcasting 
signal covers the whole of Europe. This specific subject matter requires 
efficient control of the reception of that signal, and, as the Court reco-
gnised in Coditel,64  an exclusive territorial licence achieves the aim of 
protection. However, it should be borne in mind that pirate devices are 
increasing on the market,65 and that piracy in all information outlets not 
only exists, but is very common. Reversing the Coditel judgments would 
leave (for the time being) copyright holders vulnerable to this cyber equi-
valent of burglary and theft. 
63 Joined cases C-431/09 and C-432/09 Airfield NV and Canal Digitaal BV v Belgische 
Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) and Airfield NV v Agicoa 
Belgium BVBA [2011] ECR I-000 para 83.
64 Case 62/79 (n 31) para18.
65 Extract from the Commission Green Paper on the Legal Protection of Encrypted Services 
in the Internal Market (n 53): ‘This has allowed the development, in some of those Member 
States, of a flourishing industry that manufactures, markets, installs and maintains pirate 
devices. A specialist press has also developed, providing targeted publications and commer-
cial promotion networks for pirate decoders’.
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The fact still remains that the licensing system actually decreases 
the cost of television for the end user (consumer).66 Notions such as the 
exhaustion of rights and parallel imports were made in order to help the 
consumer receive the benefits of market freedoms and, in this way, to 
fuel the economy. It is my fear that blind obedience to these notions of 
broadcasting rights would deprive the viewer of affordable television, pa-
ving the way for more piracy and illicit devices on the market, leading to 
a rapid decrease in high-quality and informative television. 
A licensing system benefits not only copyright holders, but consu-
mers and the community. Until the day we have something else in pla-
ce which can strike a balance between these interests, we should stick 
with what we have. In this specific case, the EU was right to jeopardise 
a bit of market freedom in order to preserve the copyright of a television 
broadcast. 
66 See the section above on the protection of consumers through the licensing system.
